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Abstract
Tor is a popular low-latency anonymity network.
However, Tor does not protect against the exploitation
of an insecure application to reveal the IP address of, or
trace, a TCP stream. In addition, because of the linka-
bility of Tor streams sent together over a single circuit,
tracing one stream sent over a circuit traces them all.
Surprisingly, it is unknown whether this linkability al-
lows in practice to trace a significant number of streams
originating from secure (i.e., proxied) applications.
In this paper, we show that linkability allows us
to trace 193% of additional streams, including 27%
of HTTP streams possibly originating from “secure”
browsers. In particular, we traced 9% of all Tor streams
carried by our instrumented exit nodes. Using BitTorrent
as the insecure application, we design two attacks trac-
ing BitTorrent users on Tor. We run these attacks in the
wild for 23 days and reveal 10,000 IP addresses of Tor
users. Using these IP addresses, we then profile not only
the BitTorrent downloads but also the websites visited
per country of origin of Tor users. We show that BitTor-
rent users on Tor are over-represented in some countries
as compared to BitTorrent users outside of Tor. By ana-
lyzing the type of content downloaded, we then explain
the observed behaviors by the higher concentration of
pornographic content downloaded at the scale of a coun-
try. Finally, we present results suggesting the existence
of an underground BitTorrent ecosystem on Tor.
1 Introduction
Assume that a source wants to leak top secret documents
anonymously. It is considered secure to do so through
Tor using a privacy-enhancing browser plugin such as
TorButton. However, assume that, at the same time, this
source uses another insecure application on Tor. Is it
then possible to associate the top secret documents with
the IP address of the anonymous source? The answer to
this question is yes!
By exploiting Tor’s design, one can indeed exploit an
insecure application to associate the usage of a secure
application (e.g., the one leaking top secret documents)
with the IP address of a Tor user. This attack against
Tor consists of two parts: (a) exploiting an insecure ap-
plication to reveal the source IP address of, or trace, a
Tor user and (b) exploiting Tor to associate the usage of
a secure application with the IP address of a user (re-
vealed by the insecure application). As it is not a goal of
Tor to protect against application-level attacks, Tor can-
not be held responsible for the first part of this attack.
However, because Tor’s design makes it possible to as-
sociate streams originating from secure application with
traced users, the second part of this attack is indeed an
attack against Tor. We call the second part of this attack
the bad apple attack. (The name of this attack refers to
the saying “one bad apple spoils the bunch.” We use this
wording to illustrate that one insecure application on Tor
may allow to trace other applications.)
This paper differs from the related work in three main
aspects. First, we launched our attacks on the real Tor
network for a substantial period of time and revealed
10,000 IP addresses of “anonymous” Tor users. To the
best of our knowledge, it is the largest attack against the
Tor network in number of revealed IP addresses.
Second, whereas most attacks against Tor were tar-
geted to Web browsers, we directly target P2P fileshar-
ing applications (i.e., BitTorrrent) in this study. BitTor-
rent traffic generates a significant fraction of Tor traffic
in volume (more than 40%), making it a primary target
for attackers. In addition, we show that 70% of BitTor-
rent users on Tor establish P2P connections outside of
Tor, making most BitTorrent TCP connections (and traf-
fic) invisible to the Tor network. Thus, the number of
BitTorrent users on Tor is likely to be largely underesti-
mated and so more Tor users are susceptible to our at-
tacks.
Third, whereas the principle of the bad apple attack
has been discussed in the past, it is an open ques-
tion whether it allows to trace a significant number of
streams originating from secure applications. Actually,
that ”many TCP streams can share one circuit” is listed
as the fourth improvement of Tor over the old onion rout-
ing design [5] because it is supposed to “improve effi-
ciency and anonymity.” We note that Roger Dingledine
cited an initial version of this work [3, 10] to confirm
the need to “brainstorm about ways to protect users even
when their applications are handing over their sensitive
information” on the website of the Tor Project [4]. The
main contributions of this paper are as follow:
• We design two attacks against BitTorrent to reveal
the IP address of BitTorrent users on Tor.
• We instrument six Tor exit nodes and launch our
attacks on the real Tor network for a period of 23
days. We reveal 10,000 IP addresses of “anony-
mous” Tor users.
• We show that the bad apple attack allows us to trace
193% of additional streams as compared to BitTor-
rent streams, including 27% of HTTP streams. In
total, we traced 9% of all Tor streams carried by
our instrumented exit nodes.
• We profile BitTorrent and Web usage on Tor per
country of origin (which would be impossible with-
out first tracing Tor users). (a) We show that Bit-
Torrent users on Tor are over-represented in some
countries as compared to BitTorrent users that do
not use Tor. (b) By analyzing the type of content
downloaded, we explain this behavior by the higher
concentration of pornographic content downloaded
at the scale of a country. (c) We present results that
suggest the existence of an underground BitTorrent
ecosystem on Tor.
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. First,
we briefly discuss the ethical and legal considerations of
running attacks against production systems in Section 2.
We then give an overview of Tor and explain how this
design can lead to the bad apple attack when an insecure
application reveals the source IP address of a Tor user
in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss our attack model,
two attacks against BitTorrent, and how the bad apple
attack specifically applies to BitTorrent. We show that
the bad apple attack is severe enough to profile not only
BitTorrent downloads but also the websites visited by
Tor users in Section 5. We discuss the related work in
Section 6. Finally, we summarize our contributions and
give a few perspectives in Section 7.
2 Ethical and Legal Considerations
In order to comply with the legal and ethical aspects of
privacy, we performed our analysis on the fly and do not
store any nominative information such as IP addresses.
We logged only the ASN and country of traced Tor users
to be able to perform this study. In addition, we only
present aggregated statistics as suggested by Loesing et
al. in [9]. Finally, we have also been cautious not to
inadvertently DoS Tor or BitTorrent infrastructures, or
interfere with the normal usage of those systems.
3 Background
3.1 Tor
Tor is a low-latency anonymity network. As stated in
the original paper, its main design goals are to prevent
attackers from linking communication partners and from
linking multiple communications to or from a given user.
Tor relies on an overlay network and on onion routing
to anonymize TCP-based applications like web brows-
ing and P2P filesharing. Tor explicitly made the design
choice to support only TCP which “helped portability
and deployability” [5].
When a client communicates with a server via Tor, she
selects n nodes of the Tor system (where n is typically
3) and builds a circuit using those nodes. Messages are
then encrypted n times, first with the key shared with
the last node (called exit node) of the circuit, and subse-
quently with the shared keys of the intermediate nodes
from noden−1 to node1. As a result, each intermediate
node only knows its predecessor and successor, but no
other nodes of the circuit. In addition, only the exit node
is able to recover the original message.
To improve efficiency, Tor multiplexes several
streams from the same source into a single circuit. Orig-
inally, onion routing used a separate circuit for each
stream but it required multiple public key operations for
every request [14]. It has also been argued that creat-
ing many circuits degraded privacy because it implied
to contact more Tor nodes, some of which may be com-
promised. However, we will show that, when several
streams are multiplexed into a single circuit, a single
stream whose source IP address is revealed allows an
attacker to associate many additional streams with the
same traced user.
3.2 BitTorrent
BitTorrent is a popular Peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol for
file replication. To download a content, a BitTorrent
client first discovers peers sharing that content using
centralized trackers, a distributed tracker (DHT), and
peer exchange (PEX).
Trackers are servers storing content identifiers and for
each identifier, a list of peers distributing the correspond-
ing content. A peer subscribes its IP/port to the tracker
for a given content identifier and requests a list of peers
for that content when it starts downloading and then pe-
riodically after that (e.g., every 10 minutes). Communi-
cations with trackers is typically done in clear over TCP
(i.e., through Tor) therefore a malicious exit node can
tamper with the lists of peers returned by centralized
trackers. (Furthermore, centralized tracking is some-
times also done over UDP with consequences similar to
those we discuss after.)
In addition to centralized trackers, BitTorrent clients
can also use a decentralized tracker based on a Dis-
tributed Hash Table (DHT tracking). Whereas DHT
tracking is often used in combination to centralized
tracking, it can also be used alone with Magnet Links.
BitTorrent Mainline DHT tracking works as follow.
First, a BitTorrent client (DHT tracker) picks an iden-
tifier that is coded on the same space as content identi-
fiers. Then, a peer interested in downloading a content
uses the content identifier to locate the corresponding
DHT tracker after which, it subscribes its IP/port to that
tracker and requests a list of peers (just as with a cen-
tralized tracker). Communication with DHT trackers is
done over UDP therefore a Tor user may subscribe her
public IP/port to the DHT tracker.
As a BitTorrent client discovers peers, it tries estab-
lishing TCP connections and if successful, sends an ap-
plication handshake containing the content identifier and
in the case of an extended handshake, the listening port
number. That P2P connection is also used for content
distribution. Whether a P2P connection is established
through Tor has a tremendous impact on performance
and can be configured by the user therefore a Tor user
may establish P2P connections using her public IP/port.
Finally, after using centralized or DHT tracking, more
peers can be discover using Peer Exchange (PEX). With
PEX, users typically exchange lists of peers they are
connected to over established P2P connections therefore
a Tor user may subscribe her public IP/port to her PEX
partners.
4 Attacking BitTorrent Users on Tor
4.1 Attack Model
All our attacks require to control one exit node in or-
der to trace its Tor users. From January 15 to February
7th 2010 (23 days), we instrument and monitor six Tor
exit nodes spread throughout the world (two in Asia, two
in Europe, and two in the U.S) and launch the attacks
described after. The first attack, the hijacking tracker’s
responses, also requires to control a BitTorrent peer pub-
licly connectable so it can accept incoming TCP connec-
tions and receive BitTorrent handshake messages. For
practical reasons, we performed this hijacking attack on
only one of our exit nodes.
Hijacking tracker’s responses exploits the fact that
centralized tracking is done through Tor and the list of
peers can be tampered with by a malicious exit node.
One condition for this attack to trace BitTorrent users is
that they do content distribution outside of Tor. We will
see in Section 4.2.1 that this is the case for 70% of the
BitTorrent users on Tor. The second attack exploits the
fact that DHT tracking uses UDP and so is done out-
side of Tor. We note that if DHT tracking was instead
done over TCP through Tor, it would still be possible
to perform an hijacking attack as with centralized track-
ing. We suspect that it is possible to perform similar sta-
tistical attacks with PEX and centralized UDP tracking,
however, we did not exploit them in this study.
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Figure 1: For each day, this histogram shows the propor-
tion of BitTorrent peers who use Tor only to connect to
the centralized tracker (Tracker only) or also to distribute
content (Tracker+content). All is the average over all
days. 72% of peers use Tor only to connect to the tracker.
4.2 Tracing BitTorrent Streams on Tor
4.2.1 Hijacking Tracker’s Responses
Hijacking the tracker responses consists in inserting the
IP/port of a peer controlled by the attacker (malicious
peer) into the list of peers returned by the tracker so the
targeted user connects to the malicious peer. When Bit-
Torrent peers use Tor only to connect to the centralized
tracker and not to distribute content, they will connect
to the malicious peer directly, i.e., outside of Tor, allow-
ing the attacker to trace them. But how can the attacker
distinguish between a direct connection from one that is
going through Tor?
This can be done by collecting the IP addresses of Tor
exit nodes (which are public) to check whether an in-
coming connection at the malicious peer originates from
one of these addresses. If it does, the targeted user is
distributing content through Tor. Otherwise, he uses Tor
only to connect to the tracker and the connection to the
malicious peer is direct (the source IP address field of the
IP datagrams contains the real IP address of the targeted
user).
In Fig. 1, we observe that most BitTorrent users use
Tor only to connect to the centralized tracker, making the
hijacking of tracker’s responses a simple yet efficient at-
tack. One explanation for this behavior may be that users
distribute content outside of Tor to not degrade perfor-
mance. In addition, Piatek et al. have showed that naive
spies use tracker subscriptions as evidences of copyright
infringement [13]. This might be another reason why
users are mainly concerned by anonymizing their tracker
subscription.
Because most P2P connections are established outside
of Tor, most BitTorrent streams (and traffic) are invisible
to the Tor network. Thus, the number of BitTorrent users
on Tor is likely to be largely underestimated and so more
Tor users are susceptible to our attacks.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
x 104
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Validation of the DHT Attack
Port Number
CD
F
100 101 102 103 104 105
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Torrent size (log)
CD
F
Figure 2: The distribution of the listening port number
subscribed to the Mainline DHT is uniform (top plot)
and most torrents have few peers (bottom plot), resulting
in a small number of collisions among listening ports
for peers in the same torrent. The listening port number
constitutes a good identifier of a peer within a torrent.
4.2.2 Statistical Exploitation of DHT
Tracking
The second attack exploits DHT tracking. Because DHT
tracking is carried over UDP (which Tor does not sup-
port) a BitTorrent client fails to connect to the DHT
through Tor and reverts to using its public interface to
publish his (public) IP address and listening port into
the DHT. Say the targeted user is downloading content1.
The IP address and listening port of that user are then
stored on the peer responsible of tracking content1 in
the DHT. But how can an attacker in Tor locate the peer
storing the public IP address of the targeted user? And
then, how to distinguish the IP address of the targeted
user from the other IP addresses downloading content1?
To find the information of a targeted user in the DHT,
we use the content identifier and listening port number
contained in the BitTorrent subscription to the central-
ized tracker and extended handshake messages. When
one of our exit nodes receives one of these messages, it
immediately locates the peer tracking that content iden-
tifier and collects all the IP/port couples that have sub-
scribed for that identifier. All peers who have subscribed
for that content identifier are candidates to be associated
with the Tor user. We validate that the listening port
is a good identifier of a peer within a torrent in Fig. 2.
We then associate the IP address of the only peer with
a matching listening port to the targeted user. If there is
no such peer or that there is more than one, we consider
that we have failed to trace the targeted user.
4.3 The Bad Apple Attack Applied to Bit-
Torrent
Now that we have seen how to trace BitTorrent streams,
we describe the specifics of the bad apple attack for Bit-
Torrent users. As we have already discussed, the bad ap-
ple attack can reveal the source IP address of streams in
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Figure 3: Number of non-BitTorrent streams traced per
destination port number. The bad apple attack traces a
significant number of HTTP (port 80) and HTTPS (port
443) streams.
the same circuit, or even different circuits. With BitTor-
rent as with any other application, revealing the source
IP address of streams in the same circuit is straightfor-
ward; when the source IP address of a BitTorrent stream
is revealed, all streams multiplexed into the same circuit
are associated with the same traced user.
To reveal the source IP address of streams in different
circuits, we exploit two patterns in BitTorrent signalling
traffic. The first pattern is the peer identifier which is
essentially a random string of 20 bytes. Thus, when we
observe the same peer identifier in the BitTorrent mes-
sages of different circuits, we consider that these circuits
have the same source. One problem with this first pattern
is that it does not work when communication between
peers is encrypted. To alleviate this issue, we also con-
sider communication to an IP/port freshly returned in a
tracker response as a second pattern. In particular, if in
a circuit we observe that a peer initiates communication
with an IP/port contained in a tracker response from an-
other circuit, we link the two circuits. We note that the
linkage of BitTorrent streams in different circuits is par-
ticularly severe because, when an attacker traces a Tor
user, he can potentially associate past or future circuits
with that user, without need to reveal his IP address a
second time.
We found that the bad apple attack applied to Bit-
Torrent allowed us to trace 193% of additional streams
as compared to BitTorrent streams, including 27%
of HTTP streams possibly originating from “secure”
browsers. We show the number of non-BitTorrent
streams traced per destination port number in Fig. 3.
5 Profiling Tor Users
By analyzing the traffic relayed by our exit nodes, we
evaluate that 19% of all streams on Tor are BitTorrent
streams. (We remark that this percentage is much higher
than in McCoy et al. [11], suggesting that the number of
BitTorrent users on Tor has increased since 2008.) We
Rank # % Over Country
1 958 14 0.9 US
2 937 13 5.6 Japan
3 887 13 2.8 Germany
4 369 5 1.3 France
5 354 5 1.8 Poland
6 236 3 0.9 Italy
7 232 3 0.6 UK
8 231 3 - China
9 203 3 0.7 Canada
10 200 2 1.4 Russia
Rank # Over Country AS
1 362 4.7 Germany Deutsche Telekom (3320)
2 274 5.7 Japan NTT (4713)
3 177 2 Malaysia TM Net (4788)
4 142 1 Italy Telecom Italia (3269)
5 135 1.1 France Orange (3215)
6 133 1 US AT&T (7132)
7 128 4.5 Germany Hanse Net (13184)
8 113 - China China Net (4134)
9 109 1.4 Poland TP Net (5617)
10 104 1.8 Austria UPC (6830)
Table 1: Popularity and over-representation of BitTorrent users on Tor per country (left) and AS (right).
successfully trace 9% of all Tor streams. In this sec-
tion, we use the resulting 10,000 traced IP addresses to
profile the BitTorrent downloads and websites visited by
Tor users per country of origin.
5.1 BitTorrent Profiling
We start by investigating whether BitTorrent utilization
per country and AS on Tor is different relatively to Bit-
Torrent utilization outside of Tor. We then analyze the
content downloaded by BitTorrent users on Tor for a few
interesting countries and investigate the existence of an
underground BitTorrent ecosystem on Tor. Finally, we
analyze the websites visited by Tor users per country of
origin.
5.1.1 Utilization per Country of Origin
To compare BitTorrent utilization on Tor and outside of
Tor, we need a representative sample of BitTorrent users
for each of these two utilizations. We see in Fig. 4 that,
after 10 days, most of the top10 countries and AS (in
number of IP addresses of traced Tor users) have reached
their final rank. Therefore, we have a reasonably repre-
sentative sample of the utilization of BitTorrent on Tor
in these countries and ASes.
As a representative sample of the utilization of BitTor-
rent outside of Tor, we then use a sample of 10,000,000
IP addresses collected on August 22nd 2009 on the Pi-
rateBay, the largest BitTorrent tracker at that time. In-
deed, the PirateBay was an order of magnitude larger
than the second largest BitTorrent tracker at the time of
the measurement [16] therefore we argue that a daily
sample from the PirateBay is reasonably representative
of the global utilization of BitTorrent outside of Tor. We
refer to Le Blond et al. [2] for a description of the mea-
surement methodology to collect this data.
Table 1 shows the popularity of BitTorrent users
on Tor per country (left) and AS (right). The over-
representation (Over) for a given country (resp. AS) is
the fraction of BitTorrent IP addresses on Tor in that
country (resp. AS) divided by the fraction of IP ad-
dresses outside of Tor in the same country (resp. AS).
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Figure 4: Stability of the top10 countries and ASes in
cumulated number of IP addresses of traced Tor users.
For each country and AS, we plot the evolution of the
difference between the current rank and the rank after
23 days. The duration of the measurement period is suf-
ficient for the top10 countries and ASes to be reasonably
representative of the overall utilization of BitTorrent on
Tor.
We do not show the over-representation in China be-
cause Chinese content are not generally tracked by the
PirateBay, the tracker that we have used to capture the
location of BitTorrent users outside of Tor. Hence, we
greatly over-estimate the over-representation in China.
An over-representation of 0.9 in the US means that
there is about the same fraction of US BitTorrent users
on Tor as outside of Tor. And an over-representation of
5.6 in Japan means that there are 5.6 times more Bit-
Torrent users from Japan on Tor than outside of Tor. In
other words, whereas BitTorrent US users do not hide on
Tor more than average, Japanese users strongly do. The
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Figure 6: Distributions of BitTorrent content known in
the Public and Private BitTorrent ecosystems, or Un-
known from the rest of the world. A few content are
unknown from the rest of the world.
reasons behind such behavior may be technological, po-
litical, sociological, etc.
Explaining Over-representations To investigate the
over-representations observed in Section 5.1.1, we now
analyze the types of content downloaded by Tor users
from countries with very different over-representations.
In particular, we had observed that US users were not
over-represented on Tor whereas Japanese and German
users were. In Fig. 5, we indeed see that US users are
downloading a large variety of content as compared to
Japanese users who mainly download Hentai (porno-
graphic animes), and German users who mainly down-
load pornographic movies. Therefore, we argue that the
reasons for over-representations (at least in BitTorrent)
are mainly sociological.
5.1.2 The Underground Ecosystem
BitTorrent comprises communities of users, or ecosys-
tems, among which content are distributed [16], [2],
[15]. There is one public ecosystem that can be accessed
by all Internet users [2], [16] and several private ecosys-
tems with many users whose access is restricted to reg-
istered users. Even though private ecosystems are more
difficult to monitor than the public ecosystem, registra-
tion is generally open to everyone and a single regis-
tered user can in principle monitor the whole community
[15]. Because even private ecosystems are indeed rela-
tively easy to monitor, it is probable that some private
ecosystems be known only by peculiar members (e.g.,
downloaders of child pornography) thus forming an un-
derground ecosystem.
To investigate the existence of such an underground
ecosystem on Tor, we check whether there is a subset
of the content distributed on Tor that belongs neither to
the public nor private ecosystems. We use .torrent files
from 7,110,000 BitTorrent content: 6,800,000 from the
public BitTorrent ecosystem [2, 16], and 310,000 from
the private BitTorrent ecosystem [15]. We also search
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Websites Visited by Country of Origin on Tor
Fr
ac
tio
ns
 o
f r
eq
ue
st
s
Tor
BitT
orre
nt Us
Jap
an
Ge
rma
ny
Fra
nce
Pol
and Ital
y
Chi
na UK
Can
ada
Ru
ssia
 
 
Filesharing
Hacking
Search
Porn
Others
Figure 7: Distributions of the categories of websites vis-
ited by Tor users per country of origin. Tor represents
the overall distribution of requests for all Tor users (not
necessarily traced). BitTorrent represents the overall dis-
tribution of requests for traced Tor users. The other bars
represent the same information but per country of origin.
BitTorrent users on Tor visit significantly more Hacking
websites and significantly less Search and Porn than reg-
ular Tor users.
the missing .torrent files on Google. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the largest collection of .torrent files
ever assembled. We see in Fig. 6 that 3% of all the con-
tent distributed by BitTorrent users on Tor belong neither
to the public nor private ecosystems. This result sug-
gests the existence of an underground ecosystem on Tor.
However, one would need to download these unknown
content and to check them manually in order to deter-
mine whether they belong to regular private ecosystems
for which we do not have the .torrent files or whether
they are more sensitive.
5.2 Web Profiling
We have showed that the bad apple attack allowed us to
trace 193% of additional streams as compared to BitTor-
rent streams, including 27% of HTTP streams possibly
originating from “secure” (i.e., proxied) browsers. In
the following, we use the web-filtering service of Forti-
Guard [7] to analyze the type of websites visited on Tor
per country of origin.
We show the type of websites visited per country of
origin in Fig. 7. Because they all are BitTorrent users,
traced users differ from the average Tor users (Tor).
In particular, around 50% of the requests are targeted
to filesharing websites (FileSharing) such as ThePirate-
Bay, MegaDownload, or RapidShare. Traced Tor users
also visit significantly more hacking websites suggesting
that they are interested in security. Finally, they also visit
significantly less search and porn websites than average
Tor users. This might be because they already rely on
BitTorrent rather than the Web to search and download
content, including pornographic material.
Figure 5: TagCloud of the US downloads (left), Japanese downloads (center), and German downloads (right). We
extract the tags of the BitTorrent content in the public ecosystem and vary the font size to reflect the number of content
whose tag matches those keywords. We increase the size of the keywords linearly with the frequency that they appear
in the tags. Japanese and German users use Tor to download much more pornographic material than US and other
users.
6 Related Work
Tor’s efficiency has required several adaptations to the
original design of onion routing [14] whose impact on
privacy are not well understood in practice [5]. In partic-
ular, we showed that the multiplexing of several streams
into a single circuit can significantly degrade privacy.
To date, Tor measurement studies and attacks have
been carried out in isolation. Measurement studies have
documented who is using Tor and how Tor is used but
without the ability of associating the two information,
e.g., to profile Tor users [11]. Attacks have docu-
mented methodologies to associate the two information
but without actually profiling Tor users [1, 6, 12]. This
paper strikes a balance between the two by develop-
ing new attacks targeted to P2P applications, launching
these attacks at a reasonable scale against the Tor net-
work, and profiling Tor users.
6.1 Web-level Tracing Attacks
For simplicity, we assume that the attacker always con-
trols an exit node in the attacks described hereafter.
We now describe attacks targeting Web applications to
reveal the IP address of Tor users. FortConsult designed
two attacks based on active content injection by the exit
nodes to trace Tor users [6]. The first attacks consisted
in Flash injection so that the targeted user connects to
a server controlled by the attacker outside of Tor, hence
exposing his IP address. (A cookie is used to associate
that IP address to the stream in Tor.) The second attack
consisted in injecting JavaScript to send the (local) IP
address of the user over Tor. This study reported that
whereas the first attack was effective, the second was not
mainly because local IP addresses sent over Tor were not
routable, e.g., 192.168.0.1.
Abbott et al. relied on JavaScript and HTML meta re-
fresh tag to inject timing patterns [1]. The assumption
being that users will leave that page open long enough
so that pattern can be spotted by an entry node, also con-
trolled by the attacker (thus tracing the user). It is in-
teresting to note that even users having disabled active
content are susceptible to HTML meta refresh tag injec-
tion.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to de-
sign attacks against P2P applications on Tor, to validate
these attacks at a reasonable scale, and to demonstrate
that one can associate many streams possibly originating
from “secure” (i.e., proxied) browsers, with traced users.
We remark that even though we have targeted P2P appli-
cations in this paper, the bad apple attack can originate
from any insecure application.
6.2 Measurements Studies
The main measurement study of Tor that we are aware
of has been made by McCoy et al. [11]. The authors
provided interesting insights into who is using Tor and
how Tor is used and mis-used. In particular, they showed
that BitTorrent generates 40% of all traffic on Tor and
claimed that it represents only 3% of all streams.
We complemented this measurement study in two im-
portant aspects. First, we showed that 70% of BitTorrent
users establish P2P connections outside of Tor thus mak-
ing most BitTorrent streams (and traffic) invisible to the
Tor network. We argue that this finding makes of BitTor-
rent users a target of choice on Tor. Second, we launched
attacks to profile Tor users. This profiling brought el-
ements of answer to one important question raised by
McCoy et al., that is, “... why there is such a large scale
adoption of Tor in [...] specific countries, relative to Tor
usage in other countries.” We showed that the answer
to that question (at least for BitTorrent) is unlikely to be
technological or political but in fact sociological.
7 Summary and Perspectives
Using BitTorrent as an insecure application, we de-
signed two attacks, one consisting in hijacking tracker
responses and one exploiting the statistical properties of
the DHT, to trace BitTorrent streams on Tor. We then
showed that the bad apple attack allows us to trace non-
BitTorrent streams. In particular, we traced 193% of ad-
ditional streams as compared to BitTorrent streams, in-
cluding 27% of HTTP streams possibly originating from
“secure” (i.e., proxied) browsers. In total, we traced
9% of all Tor streams carried by our instrumented exit
nodes.
We ran these attacks in the wild for 23 days and reveal
10,000 IP addresses of Tor users. Using these IP ad-
dresses, we then profiled not only the BitTorrent down-
loads but also the websites visited per country of ori-
gin of Tor users. In particular, we showed that socio-
logical reasons could explain the large number of Tor
users in certain countries relatively to other. Finally, we
presented results that suggest the existence of an under-
ground BitTorrent ecosystem on Tor.
Defending against the bad apple attack is not straight-
forward. The most effective defense would be to have
one stream per circuit, as in the original onion routing,
however, performances issues make this defense unfea-
sible. Another defense would be to isolate streams by
groups of destination port in different circuits, e.g., the
secure and the insecure circuit. Destination ports known
to be used by secure applications, e.g., 80, 22, would use
the secure circuit thus limiting the risk that the source IP
address of one stream in that circuit gets revealed by an
insecure application. One weakness of this defense is
that an attacker could trick an insecure application into
connecting to a port that is usually used by a secure
application, thus multiplexing the insecure stream into
the secure circuit. Yet another defense would be to iso-
late each application into its own circuit, hence compart-
menting the bad apple attack to the insecure application.
However, modern operating systems lack a portable way
to map an incoming stream to an application. We have
discussed our results and possible solutions to address
the bad apple attack with the Tor project.
We remark that even though the bad apple attack does
not exist in application-level anonymity networks dedi-
cated to a single application (e.g., OneSwarm [8]), the
corpus of networking applications is too broad to prac-
tically build one network for each application. In this
respect, we believe that we have validated an important
attack against the design of modern anonymity networks
and that we should defend against it to protect users pri-
vacy on the Internet.
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